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Boundaries, as described by Frank (2004), are cultural conventions that separate what 
is close—on “our side” of the boundary—from what is distant and potentially unap-
proachable, risky, and problematic. As such, boundaries are partly about distancing 
practices that have consequences. Indeed, our side of the boundary means us (insiders) 
as opposed to the Other (outsiders), and crossings such boundaries may pose risks and 
lead to various problems. Boundaries, therefore, matter. This view has also been taken 
on board by sport and exercise psychology professionals who, in both research and 
applied work, operate within and across boundaries. For example, talking about sports 
injury, Brewer and Petitpas (2005) signaled that boundaries and the ways psycholo-
gists may, in certain circumstances, overstep them are of some relevance to the field of 
abStract
Drawing on qualitative sports research, we present two stories in this article to 
explore how researchers may orient to boundaries within research encounters and 
perform boundary crossing and re-crossings. The performative narrative analysis of 
the stories highlights the fluidly shifting dynamics of sustaining and crossing bound-
aries and how this ongoing process is shaped by dialogical and monological rela-
tions. Through our analysis, we suggest that questions concerning “how close is too 
close” to research participants and “how far is too far” from them are neither simple 
nor straightforward. These questions are complex and shift in time and space, ebb-
ing and flowing, as people move between merging and unmerging, self-sufficiency 
and non-self-sufficiency, and finalizing and unfinalizing practices that colonize and 
de-colonize. Some reflections on what might be learned from theories of dialogue 
and boundary crossings within the domain of sport and exercise psychology in 
relation to colonizing practices, empathy, and claiming the final work are provided.
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sport and exercise psychology in terms of professional relationships, ethics of helping, 
and respect. Likewise, in his work on sex between a sport psychologist and an athlete, 
Anderson (2005) drew attention to the issue of “merging with the other” so boundaries 
dissolve and the ethical dilemmas this raises for both the psychologist and athlete. 
Similarly, Burke’s (2005) work on sports team communication highlighted how is-
sues of boundaries can play a key role in sport and exercise psychology research and 
practice. To give a flavor of this, consider first the following exchange between Burke 
(KB) and a coach named Norman.   
Norman: I think a big reason why I have sort of kept a distance between my players 
and me is the male-female thing.
KB: You mean a male coach with female athletes?
Norman: Yes, I always wanted to keep clear boundaries so the players, or anyone 
for that matter, don’t get any wrong ideas that could jeopardize my job. That’s one rea-
son why I’ve always had a female assistant. 
KB: Do you think your well-meaning attempt to mark clear boundaries has maybe 
gotten in the way of your just being yourself around your athletes?
Norman: I know it has. Without a doubt. (emphasis added; Burke, 2005, p. 57)
Set against this brief backdrop, questions emerge about boundaries. In particular, 
for us, how close is too close to a research participant, and how far is too far? Linked 
to these are questions regarding how do we know when we have gotten it “right?” And 
what might all this mean for sport and exercise psychology in relation to de-colonizing 
practices? Therefore, in what follows, we seek to explore these questions by providing 
and then analyzing two stories that illuminate how we have oriented to boundaries while 
doing qualitative research on the following: first, on men’s experiences of becoming dis-
abled through playing sport, and second, on distance runners’ experiences of long-term 
injury and rehabilitation. But before moving in turn to each story, it is useful first to offer 
a theoretical prologue.
theoretIcal prologue: what IS dIalogIcal reSearch, and 
why mIght Sport and exercISe pSychologIStS do It?
Questions salient to the paper include: How might we explore the ways in which we 
have oriented to boundaries while doing qualitative research? How might we tease out 
and theorize how close is too close to a research participant, how far is too far, and 
how do we know when we have gotten it “right?” One way, but certainly not the only 
way, is through narrative inquiry, in general, and theories of dialogue and monologue, 
in particular. 
In recent years, as part of the “narrative turn” in the human sciences, scholars have 
begun to treat seriously the view that people structure experience through stories and 
that a person is essentially a story-telling animal (Frank, 2004; Ochs & Capps, 1996; 
Smith & Sparkes, 2008a, 2009). This has led to a more sophisticated appreciation of 
people as active social beings and focused attention on the ways in which personal and 
cultural realities are constructed, enabled, and constrained in relation to others through 
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dialogues and monologues. With regard to dialogue and monologue, like most binary 
distinctions, the difference between them is not “pure.” As Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986) 
and Frank (2004, 2005b) point out, ultimately all storytelling and speech is dialogical 
inasmuch as all stories and speech contain remembered voices of others and orient to 
other people. Yet, as they also argue, the difference between monological and dialogi-
cal speech has practical value for thinking about what kind of people we are, want to 
be, and could be. Thus, monologue and dialogue are less an opposition than a con-
tinuum, but the differences between the ends of this continuum remain significant. 
For Bakhtin (1984) and Frank (2004), monologue can be described as a self-narra-
tive and bodily voice which believes that it alone is self-sufficient. The monological story 
speaks about relationships and truths about a world of which this voice claims privileged 
knowledge. It tells others what the speaker already knows and what the listener must 
learn. The speaker is at one end of the pipeline, the listener is at the other, and informa-
tion—knowledge and truth—flows one way. Monologues, note Bakhtin and Frank, can 
also be characterized as a self-narrative seeking, explicitly or implicitly, to merge with 
the other. Here, an individual seeks to enter the other’s life, fuse the individual’s own self 
with the other, or assimilate the other to his/her own self, thereby abridging difference 
and distance between each other. Not only is this sense of mutual otherness abridged, 
but monological narratives also tend to claim the finalizing word—the last word—re-
garding events and people.
In moving toward dialogue, in contrast, no speaker is self-sufficient, merges with 
the other, or utters finalizing words. According to Bakhtin (1984), dialogue involves 
giving up the belief of self-sufficiency. This is partly because a person realizes his/her 
self initially through others: from them we receive stories, words, forms, and tonalities 
for the formation of our initial idea of ourselves. Just “as the body is formed initially in 
the mother’s womb (body), a person’s consciousness awakens wrapped in another’s 
consciousness” (p. 138). In this sense, a person’s stories and words about his/her self 
“are structured under the continuous influence of someone else’s words about him [sic]” 
(p. 207). Thus, under this schema, no matter how personally authentic anyone wants to 
be or wants to allow others to be, and no matter how separate from others we feel we 
might be, we are always fundamentally connected and exist in relation to other people. 
None of us is ever self-sufficient; two is the minimum number for the constitution of self. 
As such, dialogue can be only created between people and it requires mutual participa-
tion. One implication of all this is that no one speaker’s story, self, or voice is ever entirely 
her or his own; we exist only on the boundary with others. “Not that which takes place 
within,” Bakhtin proposes, “but that which takes place on the boundary between one’s 
and someone else’s consciousness, on the threshold” (1984, p. 287). 
Furthermore, according to Bakhtin (1984, 1986), dialogue involves giving up not 
only the belief that one is self-sufficient but also the comforting illusion that any of us 
can, often out of sheer desire to help, merge with the other person. For Bakhtin (1990), 
this demand for not lapsing into merging with others is particularly important because 
it sustains difference. Using suffering as an example, he writes: “the other’s suffering as 
co-experienced by me is in principle different … from the other’s suffering as he [sic] 
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experiences it” (1990, p. 102). Two is the minimum, but these two have to remain differ-
ent; not apart, but distinct. This view of dialogue as involving, not merging with, another 
to sustain difference is reinforced by Clark and Holquist (1984) in the following comment:
The way in which I create myself is by means of a quest: I go out to the 
other in order to come back with a self. I “live into” an other’s conscious-
ness; I see the world through the other’s eyes. But I must never completely 
meld with that version of things, for the more successfully I do, the more I 
will fall pray to the limits of the other’s horizon. A complete fusion … even 
if it were possible, would preclude the difference required for dialogue. 
(p. 78)
Therefore, according to Frank (2005a), seeking to merge with the other might seem 
generous, but “it risks losing the mutual otherness that sustains the boundary between 
persons and thus sustains a fundamental condition for dialogue—that it be between 
persons who remain mutually other” (p. 295). As such, sustaining sufficient difference 
and distance so that there can be space between people is important in understanding 
how humans relate to each other. In sum, dialogue can be described as a form of com-
munication between simultaneous differences or horizons of understanding. And, from a 
narrative perspective, our lives and the stories we tell about them can be seen as social 
and knitted into not only monological relationships but also dialogical relations. 
Having described what dialogue and monologue can mean, why might sport and 
exercise psychology professionals undertake narrative research framed by them? The 
dialogical and monological vineyard offers a rich harvest for those pursuing an under-
standing of our lives as both personal and socio-cultural, which is absent in many tradi-
tional psychological theories (Crossley, 2000; Gergen, 1999). For many, the attraction 
of narrative study lies in its promise to enable us to think about a person who is socially 
situated and culturally fashioned at the same time as that person expresses a unique 
individuality and an agency that makes him or her at once both shaped by society and 
shaping society (Smith & Sparkes, 2009).
Furthermore, athletes, coaches, applied practitioners, and researchers swim in a 
sea of sporting stories that they hear, read, listen to, and see. For example, during a 
research encounter, a sport psychology professional may ask an athlete to share stories 
of key moments in the athlete’s career, such as stories of burnout, stories of coach-athlete 
relationships, stories of the ways in which sport parents influence their children’s psycho-
social outcomes in youth sport, or stories of injury and comeback. In doing so, they are 
actively involved in co-constructing stories by inviting stories and asking curiosity-driven 
questions that help thicken, deepen, and re-create existing stories. The stories that are 
told and received are therefore influenced and informed by what tellers, as well as the 
sport psychologist, bring to the relationship from their own lives and contexts. All of these 
notions contribute to a greater recognition of the importance of the relationship between 
the sport and exercise psychology professional and the athlete and between the knower 
and what is known (Smith & Sparkes, 2009). Indeed, Bakhtinian theories of dialogue 
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and monologue encourage us to be reflexive about the ways we operate with athletes, 
research participants, et al., how the stories we invite from others and tell ourselves 
shape, enable, and constrain relationships, and how and what knowledge is created. 
Researchers may necessarily turn attention to the quality and patterns of interaction and 
the ethical ideals of respecting difference while striving for understanding.
Another reason why sport and exercise psychology professionals might use theories 
of dialogue and monologue is that through interaction with them our understandings 
of sporting experiences and lives can potentially become deeper and more complex. 
As Nisbett (1990) argues, reading outside, rather than exclusively within, one’s own 
scientific discipline can greatly foster scientific creativity. Of course, this is neither easy 
nor straightforward. However, as scholars in what is arguably a privileged position, we 
believe it is a moral imperative to assume the responsibility to listen carefully and attempt 
to grasp what is being expressed and said in “alien” traditions. Indeed, the specter of 
all researchers marching to the same drummer of some orthodoxy does not thrill us with 
anticipation and should be a source of concern for those who see sport and exercise 
psychology as a theoretically vibrant domain, encouraging multiple and different voices 
to be heard and understood.
analytIc method: narratIVe performatIVe analySIS
According to Riessman (2008), a performative analysis, or what is sometimes called a 
dialogic analysis, is concerned with, and directs researchers’ attention to, examining 
how talk among speakers is relationally and interactively produced and performed as 
narrative. This type of narrative analysis involves a close reading of contexts, includ-
ing the influence of the researcher and socio-cultural circumstances on the production 
and interpretation of narrative within a certain situation, such as an interview setting. 
The analyst “asks ‘who’ an utterance may be directed to, ‘when,’ and ‘why,’ that is, 
for what purposes?” (p. 105). A performative analysis thus shifts from the “told”—the 
events to which language refers—to include both the “doing” and “the telling.” Cultural 
context, audiences for the narrative, and shifts in the interpreter’s positioning over time 
are brought closely into focus. Riessman further points out that language—the particular 
words and styles narrators select to recount experiences—is interrogated in fine detail, 
not taken at face value. 
In what follows, utilizing the analytic lenses provided by Bakhtin (1984, 1986), we 
present two stories based on sports-related research and subject them to a narrative 
performative analysis with the intent to explore how we orient to boundaries within quali-
tative research encounters and perform boundary crossing and re-crossing. Each story 
may perhaps be considered as too idealist. That is, “these things don’t happen in real 
life.” However, in our experience, they do hold verisimilitude (Sparkes, 2002). It should 
also be made clear that the voice(s) in the stories are those of White persons. It is to the 
first story we now turn. 
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becomIng dISabled through playIng Sport: an example of 
Self-conScIouS boundary croSSIng
The first story is taken from field notes written by Brett Smith in his research, with Andrew 
Sparkes, on men’s experiences of suffering a spinal cord injury (SCI) through playing 
sport (see Smith & Sparkes, 2005, 2008b). This story we use elucidates, for us, the use 
of a self-conscious boundary and some of the complex ways in which a researcher can 
be caught between getting too close to a participant and remaining too distant. For ease 
of reference, we have added numbers of reference to sections referred to in the narrative 
analysis that follows the story. 
[1] Just finished interviewing Doug, a 38-year old man who, during a rugby game 
nine years ago, broke his neck. Lots of interesting things about him came up during the 
interview—his unwavering desire to walk again, his lack of desire to participate in dis-
abled sport, and his fear of living in a disabled body. He also does not want help from 
others, but claims this is okay. 
[2] But, one thing keeps pricking at me, and I can’t let it go. Near the end of the 
interview, we where talking about his experiences of depression and how he feels living 
in his disabled body. I wanted to know what it felt like; I wanted to enter into his bodily 
world. I suddenly felt his bodily world of depression. I said to him, “Doug, I understand. 
I’ve lived with depression and struggle with it. Partly as a result of sporting injuries, de-
pression has me too. I know how you feel. I know the future looks bad, but you will get 
better” [Interview transcripts confirm this.] 
[3] A moment later, with tears welling up in both our eyes, I leaned across and 
gently squeezed his hand, holding it for a moment. He smiled and turned his palm to 
embrace my hand. An instant later, I felt, inside my body, the distance between us lessen. 
Our bodies briefly connected. Our damp palms were attached. I entered his sadness, 
and felt we became one.
[4] However, something felt wrong. Inside my gut, I knew I’d crossed a line between 
us. I didn’t want an interview where we were distant from each other, but here I’d over-
stepped the boundary between us. With that feeling—that knowledge inside me—I sud-
denly felt sick. The nausea abruptly bubbling in my stomach was compounded by the 
idea, the imagination, that, “I knew how he felt and he could get better.” A recent chat 
with a work colleague sprang to my mind in which he said that he knew how I felt to live 
in depression and that I should do exercise or sport because it helped him get out of his 
depression and research also proves this as a way of getting better. I thought to myself, 
“How dare he say he knows how I feel and tell me what I should do.” Inside, I was furious. 
[5] With that, I moved my hand, touched and gently squeezed his forearm, and we 
smiled to each other. I then said, “I really have no idea how you feel and what it means 
to live in your skin. I’m glad though that we’re sharing time together and I’m speaking 
with you. I hope I can also pass on your stories to others.” 
[6] Doug responded by saying, “That would be good. I’ve enjoyed sharing stuff 
and time with each other and hope my stories might help others. We can all learn from 
each other after all and help each other through life rather than trying to be someone 
by ourselves.”
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Clearly, there are multiple ways in which we could interpret the above story. Our 
interpretation here, as read through a dialogical perspective as outlined by Bakhtin 
(1984) and Frank (2004), elucidates the use of a self-conscious boundary crossing to 
reveal myself (Brett Smith)1 as a researcher performing in relation to a participant (Doug) 
grappling with the ongoing dilemma of how close is too close and how far is too far. In 
doing so, the story highlights the importance of dialogue and monologue in the process 
of getting too close and remaining too distant. That is, how boundary crossings can limit 
and sustain dialogues and monologues. 
Specifically, the story shows a transition from monologue to dialogue and the costs 
and benefits associated with this. In the first segment [1], my voice breaks into and per-
forms what can be called “traditional research talk.” I analyze and assess Doug with 
experiential authority and interpretive omnipotence, saying, “Lots of interesting things 
about him came up during the interview—his unwavering desire to walk again, his lack 
of desire to participate in disabled sport, and his fear of living in a disabled body. He 
also does not want help from others, but claims this is okay.” In these sentences, in this 
performance, I am not talking with Doug. I’m someone who has a monological voice, 
speaking about the other (Doug) who is characterized as an object of narration. In this 
monologue, developed through traditional research talk, Doug is finalized. He also be-
comes increasingly distant. 
The second segment [2], as my story unfolds, suggests the monologue continues. 
This time, however, it is not simply developed through traditional research talk. “But,” I 
add, “one thing keeps pricking at me, and I can’t let it go. Near the end of the interview 
we were talking about his experiences of depression and how he feels living in his dis-
abled body. I wanted to know what it felt like; I wanted to enter into his bodily world.” 
Now, I hint at a boundary crossing. As the sentences and performance of them develop, 
I move from a sense of distance to one of closeness. This move, though, is again mono-
logical. In seeking to enter and to know how it feels to live in body that is disabled due 
to playing sport and claiming that this has been done, I seemingly merge with Doug and 
infringe on his non-self-sufficiency. 
This monologue expands further. I aim to empathize with Doug. However, in adding 
that I “suddenly felt his bodily world of depression” and saying “I know how you feel,” I 
persist in maintaining the comforting illusion that any of us can, often out of sheer desire 
to help and empathize, merge with another. As a result, there is a failure to recognize 
the limits of empathy. That is, there are aspects of Doug’s suffering that I can never know 
or feel. Equally, I cannot know the future because it is open. But, my monological voice 
cuts this up as I say, “I know the future looks bad, but you will get better.” Thus, not only 
do I merge with another and continue infringing on the mutual otherness that sustains the 
boundary between persons—I also finalize Doug. 
A monologue principally continues in the third segment [3] of the story. Here, how-
ever, rather than privileging what is said verbally, a monological performance domi-
nates and takes place at the level of what Frank (2005a) calls body hexis. That is, how 
bodies are held in relation to other bodies, their posture, tension, and touch. Of course, 
dialogue can take place through the body, and this is very briefly suggested when I 
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say, “A moment later, with tearing welling up in both our eyes, I leaned across gently 
squeezed his hand, holding it for a moment. He smiled and turned his palm to embrace 
my hand.” Yet, this move toward dialogue through bodily touch is quickly interrupted 
by myself and turns back into monologue as I again merge with Doug by adding, “An 
instant later, I felt inside my body the distance between us lessen. Our bodies briefly 
connected. Our damp palms were attached. I entered his sadness.” This monological 
performative voice is then strengthened by myself not only merging with Doug and get-
ting too close in the process but also by lapsing into a voice of self-sufficiency; “I felt we 
became one.” Thus, the boundary between being neither self-sufficient nor merging with 
the other, which sustains dialogue, is crossed. I get too close by infringing on the other’s 
(Doug’s) side and violating what makes him other. Accordingly, monologue dominates 
within the research encounter.
But as I continue the story [4], this monologue ends as abruptly as it began. “How-
ever,” I carry on, in the bodily moment of touch, “something felt wrong. Inside my gut, 
I knew I’d crossed a line between us. I didn’t want an interview where we were distant 
from each other, but here I’d overstepped the boundary between us.” This is the moment 
I realize, internally, that I’m caught between getting too close to Doug and remaining 
too distant. I felt within my body that I’d overstepped our boundaries rather than getting 
into the boundary space between us that sustains dialogue. This embodied knowledge is 
reinforced as I recall a recent monologue with a work colleague in which the other said 
he knew “how I felt to live in depression and that I should do exercise or sport because 
it helped him get out of his depression and research also proves this as a way of getting 
better.” Just like distance can grate on people who interpret it as not caring or not being 
interested, this closeness grated on me. The space between us, which sustains dialogue, 
was violated, and I was left finalized; “How dare he say he knows how I feel and tell me 
what I should do. Inside, I was furious.”
With all this knowledge, the interview encounter as a performance is transformed. 
In segment five [5], the performance shifts from being primarily monological to being 
dialogical. Initially, this shift occurs by the body hexis of touch: “I moved my hand, 
touched and gently squeezed his forearm, and we smiled to each other.” This dialogi-
cal relation is then sustained by myself when I say, “I’ve really no idea how you feel 
and what it means to live in your skin. I’m glad though that we’re sharing time together 
and I’m speaking with you. I hope I can also pass on your stories to others.” Early in 
the sentence, Doug and I become unmerged as concern with getting too close to Doug 
is expressed. As the talk unfolds, I suggest I not only study Doug, but that I spend time 
with him, thereby playing a part in his life and inviting Doug as a research participant 
genuinely to participate. This dialogical relation continues as I speak not about Doug 
but rather with him. Further, by hoping to share the other’s stories, my voice is present 
in Doug’s voice but still remains distinguishable. My voice thus never merges here with 
Doug, but neither voice is self-sufficient. I’ve gotten in there between myself and Doug as 
a research participant in an unfinalizing manner.
This dialogical quality, and the performance of it, is maintained in the sixth segment 
[6]. This is done by Doug, however, as he responds to me: “That would be good. I’ve 
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enjoyed sharing stuff and time with each other and hope my stories might help others. 
We can all learn from each other after all and help each other through life rather than 
trying to be someone by ourselves.” Now Doug’s voice is given authority. It a voice un-
merged with mine. It is also one that treats others as non-self-sufficient and questions the 
monological freedom of the individual to become himself, by himself. Thus, like myself in 
the previous two segments, a balance between being neither self-sufficient nor merged 
goes some way to being achieved, which sustains the boundary between Doug and I, 
and the boundary sustains dialogue. 
We will now consider the next story.
long-term InJury among dIStance runnerS: an example of 
autoethnographIc boundary negotIatIonS
The second story performed and recounted is based on research log extracts written by 
Jacquelyn Allen Collinson and her co-researcher, John Hockey, as part of a two-year col-
laborative autoethnographic study of distance runners’ experiences of long-term injury 
(see, Allen Collinson & Hockey, 2001).2 In our analysis, we highlight the delicate and 
ongoing negotiation of self-other boundaries between two long-term training partners—
and qualitative researchers—who by coincidence experienced very similar knee injuries 
during the same cross-country season. In an attempt to capture something positive out of 
what appeared at the time to be highly deleterious disruptions to athletic identities (Allen 
Collinson & Hockey, 2007), it was agreed to initiate the collaborative autoethnographic 
study. The following extracts are taken (with the permission of the author’s co-researcher) 
from the individual injury-rehabilitation logs in which field notes were recorded, each 
participant seeking to act as the “primary recipient” (Ochs & Capps, 1996) of the other’s 
data.  
It should be explained that, in addition to the individual logs kept by the research-
ers, a joint log was also compiled, within which analytical themes and concepts were 
generated. For example, if one of us had documented a particular narrative theme, the 
other’s log would be examined for similar or related themes.  Subsequently, the precise 
composition of that theme, its constituents, boundaries, and connections to other themes 
already generated would be analyzed. Thematic or conceptual differences between 
the accounts were identified and, wherever possible, reconciled, in terms of definition. 
The field note extracts below record individual responses to the same incident when one 
participant, John, endured an acute and painful set-back in his rehabilitative program, 
and the author, Jacquelyn (hereafter I, me, and so on), reflects in her field notes on her 
responses and attempts to regulate her own emotions in order to offer more effective 
support to her running partner. Again, for ease of reference, numbers are appended to 
sections referred to in the subsequent narrative analysis. 
John’s field note:
[1] Yesterday evening we had a bad patch ... We negotiated a small pitch both up 
and down, everything seemed ok, until about 50 yards on my knee began to STAB me 
very sharply … I pull up quickly, taking the weight on my good leg, full of dread. I sit on 
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the ground and explode with frustration, furious expletives darken the air repeatedly. J 
comes over quickly to give me support. I berate my knee, I berate our decision to add 
in the pitch to the program (“idiot, idiot, it was all too soon, I knew we shouldn’t have 
done it”). My frustration bubbles over as I glance at the micro tape recorder in her hand: 
“Don’t you dare turn that fucking thing on!” She moves around me smoothing me down 
with her words; it takes her an age. I limp home awkwardly; she gives me a cuddle on 
the way. 
Jacquelyn’s related fieldnote:
[2] J has just had a really difficult run. We attempted a very small incline for the first 
time, just to test the knees a little to see if they would cope with the slope … then sud-
denly J had a vicious, stabbing pain in his knee, which forced him to pull up immediately. 
[3] [J is] Understandably furious ... Really concerned about J, he was obviously in 
pain, absolutely livid, and it could have set him back weeks ... I didn’t know whether to 
hug him or to stand back and give him some breathing space. Tried to be sympathetic, 
but also calming and supportive and positive. Took all my energies, but I know just how 
he feels.
[4] [Later that evening] ... J has been icing up the knee at regular intervals until the 
skin turns the requisite degree of pink. We are both incredibly anxious, what if … what 
if …? “It’ll be fine, bud, it’s probably just a tweak and will settle down by the morning.” 
As soon as the words are spoken, though, I know they are more in faith and hope than 
anything. “Let’s hope so,” I add fervently so as not to frustrate him further.
While the above field notes could be analyzed and interpreted in myriad ways, use 
of the dialogical perspective highlights—as in Brett’s story above—the shifting self-other 
boundaries of the performative, interactional encounter. The story also highlights the nar-
rative fluctuations between monological and dialogical modes and between finalizing/
unfinalizing practices and utterances. The first sentence of segment two [2], for example, 
indicates a monological voice being performed as I assess what has occurred during 
the training session: “J has just had a really difficult run.” Here, I’m talking about John, 
assessing the difficulty of the experience for him; he is the objectified focus of this part of 
the narrative, and a degree of distance is evident in the relative “neutrality” of the initial 
statement. However, a more metaphoric portrayal of John’s pain subsequently signals my 
more empathetic stance in describing his pain: “… then suddenly J had a vicious, stab-
bing pain in his knee, which forced him to pull up immediately.” Although it is unclear 
from this segment whether these are John’s descriptors of his pain or my evaluation, the 
words “STAB” [1] and “stabbing” [2] suggest that some verbal interchange regarding 
the nature of the pain took place and narrative congruence was established regarding 
the nature of the pain. 
In the third segment [3], my words reflect a degree of merging, as I record my 
acknowledgement that John is “[u]nderstandably furious,” hinting at my belief in an 
imagined shared lived-body experience and emotional response, in that, were I to find 
myself in the same position, I’d probably express the very same emotional response. 
Bakhtin (1990), however, warns of the illusion that we can, even in our desire to help, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 09
:14
 13
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
2 
B. Smith, J. Allen Collinson, C. Phoenix, D. Brown, and A. Sparkes
352
merge with the other, while Frank (2004) portrays as generous the dialogic relationship 
in which participants do not seek to merge with the other. This unmerging allows for the 
acknowledgement of shared lived experience but also of difference and distance so 
that each person has the self-space not to share the same identity but to share affinities. 
The tendency toward narrative merging is quickly followed [3] by a return to a 
clearly monological voice as I again talk about John as object: “Really concerned about 
J, he was obviously in pain, absolutely livid and it could have set him back weeks …,” 
re-establishing some degree of distance (Frank, 2004). Reflexivity then pervades the 
field note as I reflect upon my own indecisiveness in knowing what was best to do for 
John, a self-dialogical voice emerges as I debate with myself the options of which body 
hexis (Frank, 2005a) to adopt: “I didn’t know whether to hug him or to stand back and 
give him some breathing space.” The self-analysis proceeds as the fieldnote [3] records, 
“Tried to be sympathetic, but also calming and supportive and positive. Took all my 
energies …” Although the stated intention was to be “sympathetic,” my reflections and 
self-doubt demonstrate a degree of awareness of the limits of sympathy and empathy, 
a respecting of a degree of mutual otherness, and the need for John to retain his own 
space (both physical and interactional). This serves to maintain the dialogical space 
between us.  
The final sentence of the fieldnote [3], however, returns to a monological perfor-
mance in my emphatic, colonizing statement to self, “but I know just how he feels.” 
Although there might indeed have been similarities in experiences of the injury and 
rehabilitation processes, as articulated both at the time and subsequently during data 
analysis, nevertheless, there were clearly elements of these processes that were highly 
specific and individual to each participant and could never be fully known or felt by the 
other, however much s/he might have believed them to be shared. My empathetic pro-
jection (“I know just how he feels”), even though not uttered to John himself, reflects my 
presumption of shared feelings, experiences, and emotions, which infringes upon the 
boundaries between persons and moves toward merger with, and colonization of, John. 
In the final segment [4], in an attempt later that evening to comfort and encourage 
my frustrated and despondent training partner, I state: “It’ll be fine, bud, it’s probably 
just a tweak and will settle down by the morning,” but then pauses to reflect almost 
immediately—“As soon as the words are spoken”—that there is hollowness in the words; 
they represent more of a wish than a statement of fact—“they are more in faith and hope 
than anything.” The monologic utterance is finalizing in its quasi-diagnostic phrasing: 
“It’ll be fine, bud, it’s probably just a tweak and will settle down by the morning,” which 
seems to pre-judge the outcome of the suspected new set-back and to finalize John and 
all his interpretations of the incident. 
Reflecting subsequently with discomfort on this statement, it brings back memories of 
a recent brief interchange by text message with a close friend after I underwent a medi-
cal diagnostic test. The friend, doubtless with the best of intentions to be encouraging 
and reassuring, responded to my anxious text upon leaving the consultation with what 
was then perceived to be a curt and dismissive: “It’ll be fine,” and then proceeded to 
mention some item of work news. Similarly to Brett’s instance, this evoked the hot fury 
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and resentment of the moment, of being “closed down” and denied the legitimacy of 
feelings, of being finalized. In the fieldnote [4], a shift toward undoing such finalizing is 
performed relatively quickly. As I recognize inwardly the error and inadequacy of my 
words, with the hasty addendum of, “Let’s hope so”, I re-open the dialogic space and 
counter the previous “closing” statement of: “It’ll be fine…”. Thus, it is acknowledged that 
there is a need to honor John’s unfinalizability and the openness and “unknowability” 
of the future.
Some reflectIonS
Drawing on the theories of dialogue and monologue, in this article we presented two 
stories based on sports research and analyzed them through a performative narrative 
analysis with the intent to explore how people orient to boundaries within research en-
counters and perform boundary crossing and re-crossing. It has highlighted the fluidly 
shifting dynamics of sustaining and crossing boundaries and how this ongoing process 
is shaped by dialogical and monological relations. In doing so, we suggest that ques-
tions concerning “how close is too close” to research participants and “how far is too 
far” from them are neither simple nor straightforward. They are complex and context-
dependent, shifting in time and space, ebbing and flowing, as people move between 
merging and unmerging, self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency, and finalizing and un-
finalizing practices. 
At the same time, in this article we reveal how research practices can move from 
being colonizing to being de-colonizing. That is, colonization can partly occur through 
monologues because in them there is a merging with the other, the other is treated as 
self-sufficient, and is finalized. When people speak in a monological voice, they infringe 
on the other’s side, violate what makes them other, and utter final words that rule out all 
competing voices and close down who the other might be in the future. De-colonization, 
however, may take place in dialogue. This is because in dialogical relations bodies are 
unmerged, non-self-sufficiency is respected, and the other’s unfinalizability is honored. 
Therefore, the practice of monologue can result in colonization while dialogical relations 
can be practices that de-colonize research. That said, none of this is to presuppose 
some dichotomy between colonizing/de-colonizing research. Such a presupposition is 
problematic because practices that utter monological and dialogical words are fluid, 
shifting, and dynamic. Thus, colonizing and de-colonizing research practices are per-
haps best viewed along a continuum and as involving an ongoing and dynamic process 
of dialogue and monologue. 
With all this in mind, the question regarding what might be the implications of 
boundaries and theories of dialogue in relation to sport and exercise psychology and 
de-colonizing methods still remains. We offer two interrelated points.3 The first relates 
to empathy. In terms of de-colonizing methods and qualitative research, empathy is 
important. For example, striving to be empathetic during interviews is a potential way to 
minimize colonizing the other and respect the otherness. Likewise, as Kvale (1996) and 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) suggest in relation to qualitative interviewing, empathy can be 
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important because it may increase our ability to understand better the other person, en-
gender rapport, generate “rich” data, and thereby help obtain significant knowledge of 
the human situation. Thus, empathy is held up as something for which sport and exercise 
psychology professionals—both in research interviews and applied practice—should 
often strive. Bakhtin’s (1984, 1986, 1990) theories of dialogue reinforce this. 
At the same time, however, they also invite us to be acutely aware of the limits of 
empathy. As Frank (2005a) points out, “Dialogue begins with empathy, but sustaining 
dialogue requires recognition of the limits of empathy ... A human life is lived between 
the threats of inflicting or having inflicted upon us two complementary forms of violence” 
(p. 298). One form is the routine violence of isolation that comes from treating ourselves, 
and treating others, as self-sufficient. Much like many psychological theories of the self, 
it treats the other person as autonomous and acting from inherent qualities located within 
the self. In doing so, it too conveniently ignores that people often act in response to how 
they perceive they are being treated. The complementary violence, adds Frank, is to 
treat the other person as feeling what I feel. Here, as in Brett’s story above, empathy can 
easily turn into projection, or sometimes introjection, which is another illusion of merging 
with the other person. As Frank notes, “The former, routine violence of isolation claims 
that you are as you are, and I have no effect on you being that way. The latter violence 
of empathetic projection claims that you are as I am, and I know how you feel” (p. 299). 
Others have also noted that we should recognize the limits of empathy. For ex-
ample, Rubin and Rubin (1995) offered the following caution to researchers and applied 
professionals: “You may find that the borderline between showing empathy for another 
person, listening with concern and belief, and overrapport, identifying so much with 
those you study that you forget who you are, is easily crossed” (p. 119). More recently, 
Mackenzie and Scully (2007) suggested that there are difficulties and dangers with at-
tempts to empathize when one aspires to merge with the other by imaginative projection 
(e.g., imagining being another or “in the other’s shoes”): 
The difficulty of empathetic imagining is that it requires us to be able to 
adopt the other person’s perspective as unselfconsciously as we adopt 
our own when we imagine from our own point of view. It also requires 
us to be able to predict what the other person would think and do in the 
myriad situations she might encounter, and to reproduce and anticipate 
her emotional responses. Perhaps even more problematically…it requires 
us to be able to inhabit the other’s embodied modes of engagement with 
the world. (pp. 341-342)
None of this, however, is to say that empathy should be abandoned. On the con-
trary, empathetic imaginative engagement with the perspectives of others does play an 
important role in developing moral emotions and in exercising moral judgment as part 
of de-colonizing methods. That said, there are also dangers attached to assuming one 
can empathize with the other by imagining merging with them. For instance, we may 
simply end up projecting our own perspective on to the other, rather than responding to 
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the other as other, thereby colonizing them. Likewise, for Mackenzie and Scully (2007), 
even if one is well-intentioned, one may end up projecting one’s own fears and hopes 
onto the other, misrepresenting the other person’s views and needs, and arriving at moral 
judgments that are inappropriate, paternalistic, and colonizing. Thus, there are both 
benefits and dangers attached to empathy. One can easily move from a de-colonizing 
practice to a colonizing practice. Given this, rather than taking it for granted as some-
thing one should perform at all times and see as always beneficial, sport and exercise 
psychology professionals may need to be reflexive about the limits of empathy. Theories 
of dialogue can help with this. 
Second, dialogic theories point us to another possibility in relation to how we might 
move from colonizing methods toward de-colonizing methods. This possibility revolves 
around moving from practices that are finalizing to un-finalizing. Finalization, as outlined 
by Bakhtin (1984) and Frank (2004), can be as described as someone uttering words 
that claim the last word, the definitive, final word, about those who fall within their 
purview. One example of finalization is when a person responds to another in research 
reports, interviews, or clinical practice by saying such things as, “You are definitely 
depressed because of your serious sporting injury and need to be treated. You should 
see a sport psychologist or therapist, definitely engage in exercise, and then you will 
get better. The future is good for you. You will be back playing or running.” Likewise, 
finalization can occur when a person claims, for instance in research reports, that there 
is nothing more to be said about subjects or participants, concludes with certainty and 
offers causal descriptions, or writes that the other will be the same as they have always 
been and will not change. 
Therefore, one potential consequence of finalization is colonization. For example, 
because finalized monologues claim authority and to speak truths about a world of 
which a person claims privileged (and often White) knowledge, monological finaliza-
tion can silence other voices, thereby moving toward colonization. To add context to this 
example in relation to sport psychology, consider the following: A sport and exercise 
psychology professional working with or interviewing a disabled male may want to hear 
stories about “heroic recovery” and regaining a “performing body” following a spinal 
cord injury. In part, this may be because it is the story the professional prefers and is the 
one that follows the heroic, masculine, and White models of Western sport in which the 
professional has been encultured. In other words, it is the personal and cultural ontol-
ogy the professional desires to hear. However, if the professional imposes these on to 
participants, not only may the sport and exercise psychology professional be complicit 
in sustaining and reproducing existential and culturally preferred stories that might by 
disempowering and problematic, but he may also interfere with people’s rights to tell 
their own tales, tales that may lack the coherence, plot, or resolution the individual, and 
(sub)culture, desires. In this light, as the preference for a certain story is imposed on to 
participants, it finalizes them which, in turn, can result in colonization of subjectivity and 
misrepresentation of the cultural other.  
Furthermore, finalization can lead to colonization because uttering the final word on 
a person can foreclose the options to live in a different way. The individual may likewise 
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be left feeling that there is nothing more in her, nothing more to be said about her, and 
there are no other prospects. Thus, according to Bakhtin, to finalize the other person is 
not only an empirically inadequate description of the human condition, but it can leave 
that person “hopelessly determined and finished off, as if he [sic] were already quite 
dead” (p. 58). For Bakhtin, all that is unethical begins and ends when one human being 
claims to determine all that another is and can be; when one person claims that the other 
has not, cannot, and will not change, that she or he will die just as she or he always has 
been. In doing so, colonization can result.
Given that one potential consequence of finalization is colonization, a move toward 
un-finalization may be pertinent. One possible way to do this is through speaking with 
the other, not just about the person (Frank, 2004). Likewise, when considering how to 
engage in unfinalized dialogical relations in sport and exercise psychology, profession-
als may avoid saying of another during an interview or while writing, “This is who such 
a person is.” One can say, at most, “This is how I see this person now, but I cannot know 
what she or he will become.” Indeed, dialogue depends on perpetual openness to the 
other’s capacity to become someone other than whoever she or he already is. Another 
way sport and exercise psychology professionals might do unfinalized dialogical rela-
tions is to pass on unsettling questions through the tales they write (e.g., realist tales, 
autoethnographies), rather than seeking final answers and settling for those which are 
typical of colonizing practices inherent in monological works.
Further, researchers may represent their research as part of an ongoing process 
that is evaluated as inconclusive, or as open ended, which in dialogical theory is both 
empirically correct and ethically appropriate (Frank, 2005b). Indeed, in Bakhtin’s (1984) 
dialogical ideal, our methodological representations of research could be understood 
not as final statements of whom the research participants are but as one move in a con-
tinuing dialogue through which those participants will continue to form themselves, as 
they continue to become who they may yet be. This line of argument brings Bakhtin to the 
view that is, for him, a principle of ethics and empirically adequate research: “As long 
as a person is alive he [sic] lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not 
yet uttered his ultimate word” (p. 59). Accordingly, when using various methods such as 
interviews, analytic strategies, and writing in different ways, sport and exercise psychol-
ogy professionals might consider shifting from monologues that finalize a person toward 
dialogic words that do not finalize them.
With such points in mind, we hope that this article encourages sport and exercise 
psychology professionals to consider theories of dialogue and monologue. In the spirit of 
dialogic relations, it is intended not as the final word or the model for others to simply fol-
low. Instead, this article seeks to act as an invitation and opening for sport and exercise 
psychologists to take seriously the relationships in which they engage, how they orientate 
to boundaries, and the consequences this may have for themselves and others. We look 
forward to engaging in dialogue with others.
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endnoteS
1 In what follows, rather than writing in the third person, we refer to Brett Smith, and then Jacquelyn Allen Col-
linson in the next story, in the first person. Thus, first person terms, like “I” or “me,” are used in each story to 
represent each respective author. This representational strategy was chosen because writing in the third person 
may create the impression that we are objective. We wanted to foreground ourselves as embodied, personal-
ized, and subjective (Sparkes, 2002).
2 For an overview of autoethnography in sport see Sparkes (2002). It is sufficient to say that autoethnography 
is an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting 
the personal to the cultural. 
3 These points are, of course, not exhaustive. For example, readers of this article may see a connection with, and 
in the future wish to tease out issues with regard to, Relational Cultural Theory. Given the current voices of the 
article are the unspoken, normative (fe)male White voice, troubling issues of diversity in relation to boundaries 
may be another point to consider in the future.
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